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Champagne liberals and « classes
dangereuses »
Class, Identity and Cultural Production in the Contemporary Global
System
Jonathan Friedman
1 The study of  class became rather unpopular in the 80s and 90s in many quarters of
Anthropology that presume to deal with the contemporary world, with the urban, the
global, the ethnic and the issues that are patently arenas where conflict appears to be
ubiquitous  today.  Part  of  this  absence  is  related  to  a  more  general  turn away from
materialism and even from structure and a certain determinism that was associated with
the most mechanical versions of materialism. In the United States these years witnessed
the so‑called « cultural turn » and the post‑modernist decline of theoretical paradigms.
This is a period which also is permeated by the decline of society‑wide political projects
and ideologies and the rise of culturally based identity movements in which many begin
to look to the past rather than the future for their self‑affirmation. Roots, ethnic politics,
multiculturalism, indigenism, regionalism, religiousity all expand quite rapidly from the
mid‑70s. This takes more or less violent forms depending on the particular context, but in
all cases the issue of culture becomes paramount. This is not, of course, culture in the
usual anthropological sense of the specificity of life forms and their products, but culture
as identity, especially self‑identity, a more limited selection from cultural worlds for the
sake of self‑expression. It  evinces a decline of modernism, but also a decline of state
finances in general and of welfare state programs in specific, one that has led to a real
decline in real wages throughout most of the period, with variations from country to
country. The contraction of the nation state – or, perhaps the separation of the state from
the nation, in the form of the rise of new political classes – is an aspect of the process that
I try to address in the following pages. 
2 Here I propose that the issue of class is doubly important. First, I suggest that the current
discourse of  globalization,  not  least  in  Anthropology,  is  very much a  product  of  the
transformation of class and cultural formations in the contemporary situation. Second,
the study of this transformation in itself should help us to understand a number of other
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phenemona that have become increasingly salient and which are related to globalization
which is, in our analysis, a historical phase within an already established global system
and not as sometimes assumed, a general evolutionary stage into which we are finally
moving as in the phrase « once we were local, but now we are global ». This is a vision
that I have called the « leaky mosaic », one that in cultural terms is the source of the
popular  term,  hybridity.  In  this  approach,  globalization  occurs  in  definite  historical
moments which usually entail hegemonic decline in some places and a shift of wealth or
capital to potentially new hegemons. This Braudelian view has been recently developed in
detail  by  researchers  such  as  Arrighi  (1997,  2003)  and  Wallerstein  (2003).  Arrighi
especially views the decline of the United States and the rise of China as systemically
linked phenomena, a position for which we have argued for a number of years. Such
periods of global shift have occurred often in the past centuries, most recently at the end
of the 19th century, and they are characterized by extreme turbulence; financial bubbles,
capital  export,  political  and  cultural  fragmentation,  class  polarization,  population
displacement  and  mass  migration,  and  all  of  the  phenomena  associated  with
globalization. In such periods there is also an increasing saliency of the latent opposition
between cosmopolitan elite identity and national/regional/indigenous localism. 
3 In the following I suggest that there are certain invariants involved in the last 500 years
of the European state systems with respect to just such polarities as local/cosmopolitan
identification, ethnicity in relation to territory which are crucial to understanding the
nature of the nation‑state as a particular constituted political form and the current re-
emergence  of  pluralist  ideologies  and  what  might  appear  to  be  the  « evolutionary »
demise of the nation state but which is more of a separation of the state from the nation,
one in which the cosmopolitan/local divide has become ever more salient. It is argued
that cosmpolitanism and localism become marked in definite historical periods even if
the  categories  are  always  potentially  available.  It  is  this  conjunctural,  even  cyclical,
specificity that might account for the current elaboration of these categories and their
penetration  into  academic  discourses  such  as  anthropology.  While  the  discourses  of
globalization  offer  some  surprising  similarities  with  traditional  cosmopolitan  and
aristocratic representations, the particular configuration of class position, identity and
cultural production can be quite different. That is, the contemporary cultural/class order
might be envisaged as a specific transformation of a single category structure rather than
an entirely new product.
1.  
Structures of the Long Run
4 Categories  such  as  globalization,  cosmopolitan  elites,  national  elites,  middle  classes,
immigrant minorities, regional minorities and indigenous populations are not categories
that  appear  in  a  particular  historical  era.  They  are  basic  structural  features  of  the
capitalist state system, and more specifically the nation state system. Their salience may
vary over time, but they exist, at least potentially, throughout the history of the system.
It might be argued that the nation form is a product of capitalist state organization. This
is however a mere potential that depends upon a number of different processes only
some of which are strongly connected to the commodification of social relations within
the territorial state. The process by which local solidarities and institutions are dissolved
by the joint action of the state and commerce and by which the individual is liberated
from dependency on lower order social relations to become in turn dependent upon the
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wage relation, whether high or low, is a process that gradually empties the social space
between the self and the state. This is a variable process that only approximates an ideal
type in social democratic states which in the contemporary period have sought to sever
all bonds that are not themselves state organized. Thus the family may be replaced by a
string of socializing agencies, from day care to university at the same time as the wage
labor/tax nexus becomes generalized to such an extent that the individual is rendered
totally independent economically on former social networks. This is a process that has
been  described  in  terms  of  individualization  and  is  a  principle  charateristic  of
« modernity ». It is in a highly atomized social field that identification with the state can
replace  other  collective  identities,  especially  if  socialization  into  the  nation  is
institutionalized. The space is then filled with propositions about reality, about relations
to nature, to destiny, to history. This, of course, can occur without the dissolution of
lower level structures as has been proven throughout the 19th and 20th centuries. The
nation state form is not merely a relation between individualized subjects and a larger
collectivity. It is also an organization that envelops and cuts across class relations. This is
a complex affair with plenty of variation of course, but it is crucial to understanding the
dynamics of interstate relations as well as the transformation that we have come to know
as the welfare state. As this is not an essay in history but in structure, I do not intend to
delve into the variations of national identity within modern states. I  shall focus on a
single phenomenon, the relation of a self-defined people and the state as the focal point
for a practice of self-identification, in either positive or negative terms, depending on the
particular social position from which actors practice their identifications. Thus the fusion
of state and people in Sweden earlier this century can be contrasted with what appears to
be a radical opposition between nation and state in Australia (Kapferer, 1988). It has been
argued that class struggle has been organized in terms of a We, a self‑identified people,
against capital, with or without the support of the state. The state has been « captured »
by certain working class movements, at least ideologically transforming the former into
an extension of peoplehood itself. Sweden is certainly a prime example of this, but it is to
be noted that the fusion thus imposed has a strange past. The notion of « people’s home »
a society equivalent to a family is not an invention of the left but of the conservatives, a
not  uncommon  variation  on  the  paternalist  ideology  of  the  conservatives.  This  was
assimilated into social  democratic  ideology and has played a  crucial  role  in national
politics allowing elites to impose a total restructuring of working class lives, from racial
hygiene to housing, in the name of a union of a national population under the aegis of a
single  social  project.  It  is  not  then so  extrordinary  that  the  word  society commonly
substitutes for state in political and even everyday discourse. While the Swedish case is
something of an extreme, the same parameters can be found in most nation states1. The
latter relate to the role of the state as an instrument of the people and to the need to
pronounce broadly social goals that indicate the self‑evident responsibility of the state
with regard to the people’s welfare. This ideology concerns the rights of the working class
as well as the responsibility of capitalists. While there are clearly liberal interpretations
of the nation state in which the market is said to ensure the welfare of all, it is necessary
that the welfare of all  is stressed, i.e.  that the capitalists also wish the best for their
workers. The good in this model is welfare itself, the wellbeing, well financed, of ordinary
people. The taming of social elites is part of the process of welfare development, the
submission of all to a common project. The logic of this process of consolidation in which
people and state become joined if not fused, generates the category of the « we », a « we
the  people ».  And this  occurs  under  the  umbrella  of  the  territorial  state  itself.  It  is
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bounded and tends toward the assimilation or at least integration of differences within a
larger core of a common project.
5 It might well be argued that the nation state as such is no constant in the history of the
modern  world,  but  that  a  certain  tendency  in  class  formation  has  been  more  of  a
structure of the longue durée. Here I would like to suggest something along these lines, but
the structure to which I refer is not a particular set of class categories. Instead it is a
tendency to the distribution of positions with respect to local populations and the larger
regional, or global, arena. This is a structure that has distributed a number of categories
with respect to one another, from interstate or cosmopolitan elite relations to localized
relations to more limited state or sub-state territories. I have previously represented the
structure in the following terms:
6 1
7 The graphic representation applies to a global arena organized into nation states, but the
categories are similar in fundamental ways even in other state formations. In earlier eras,
for example, the state elites were at the same time cosmopolitan elites, as aristocrats that
participated in an interstate realm in which royalties and aristocracies were joined in
marriage and political alliances, in which they sent handicraft specialists, architects and
artists from court to court in generous gestures. These states were not nation states in
any  sense.  They  were  aristocratic/royal  domains  linked  by  marriage  and  political
alliances as well as by conflict and warfare. Territorial populations were not integrated
into the larger territory as a mass of individuals. Instead there were numerous regional
and local political structures. Migration was certainly an integral part of the dynamics of
such states, the product of royal policies and demands for specialized labor. But insofar as
ordinary people were subjects rather than citizens they were essentially pawns in a larger
set of strategies. National or ethnic identity was limited primarily to local groups and
regions or to diasporic populations. And there was clearly identification with larger units
on the part of warriors and those who could gain by becoming attached to royal courts. 
8 What is important for this discussion is the continuum from the local to the interstate
level and the potential oppositions that developed among them. However, it should be
clearly noted that the very praxis of the absolutist state created a social field of national
identity.  Long  before  the  French  Revolution  there  were  letters  of  « naturalisation »
offered to foreigners who came to live in the country. This was a hotly debated issue
surrounding the imposition of taxes on foreigners in 1697. There was a great deal of
migration and aristocratic tourism following the war against the Augsburg coalition. As
one contemporary described it:
9 Depuis que la paix était faite, il y avait eu dans Paris un si grand abord d’étrangers que l’on en
comptait quinze à seize mille dans le faubourg Saint‑Germain seulement… au commencement de
l’année suivante, on trouva qu’il y en avait trente‑six mille dans ce seul faubourg (Dubost & Sahlins
1999: 15).
10 And the word « nation » is used to identify individuals throughout the period, terms such
as:
11 Anne Sauvage, « anglaise de nation » described as « pas mariée en France, qu’elle ne suit pas la
coutume de Paris et qu’elle n’est pas naturalisée » (id.: 378).
12 Jacques  Lieurard,  a  protestant  convert  from the North of  France wrongly taxed as  « fils  d’un
étranger originaire de Hollande » (id.: 379). Francais imparfaits (id.: 380).
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13 Immigrant status was also inherited for three generations for those arriving after 1600,
that is,  it  was defined in terms of descent from specific national origins.  The author
Fénélon expresses in his Aventures de Télémaque a clear opposition to what he associates to
the urban, commercial, foreign merchants and the international from a position that can
be  interpreted  as  Christian  and  agrarian  (1920:  391).  There  is  a  twofold  set  of
representations generated in this division between the peasant and the urban sectors of
the larger territory. The latter insists on the royal strategy of the state elites to increase
their  economic  base,  demographically  and  in  capital,  the  former  on  an  increasingly
salient notion of a national population, sedentary and exploited by the latter. It might be
suggested that this growing opposition is the foundation for the French Revolution in
which  « peoplehood »  is  established  as  a  sovereign  body  within  the  confines  of  the
territorial state, thus creating the nation state. As the Abbé de Sieyès stated the case in
1789, it is the sovereign people and not the king that incarnates the nation, the « Third
Estate » is a « corps d’associés vivant sous une loi commune et représentés par le même
législateur » (Noiriel, 2001: 89).
14 It is noteworthy that there is a notion of the larger world in opposition to the local and
the parochial that appears as a historical invariant. This is more clearly expressed in the
elite sector than in the popular sector. It accounts for the early appearance of religious
doctrines that are clearly global in scope. In the early 17th century there are fairly clear
expressions of a notion of a single humanity, of the need for the establishment of a world
order, not, in fact, foreign to the Catholic Church’s interpretation. The Rosicrucians are
said to have published, in 1614, a pamphlet entitled Fama. In that pamphlet it is proposed
that all learned men throughout the world should join forces towards the establishment
of a synthesis of science. Behind this effort stood allegedly an illuminated brotherhood –
« the children of light », who had been initiated in the mysteries of the Grand Order. This
« Brüderschaft der Theosophen » was said to have been founded by Christian Rosencreutz
(1378‑1484),  who had become an initiate during his travels in the Middle East in the
fifteenth century. He founded a brotherhood which was supposed to have operated in
secret ever since. 
15 Now it is somewhat less clear to what extent there were indigenizing or nationalizing
tendencies in the early history of Europe, but it is widely accepted that the nation state
was very much a project of state oriented elites with the caveat that the latter produced
an opposing project rooted in the exploited classes to capture the state and make it an
instrument in the service of its own needs. The various regional and local resistences that
proliferated  within  emerging  absolutist  states  are  evidence  that  there  were  and  are
numerous  sub-state  identities  of  varying  strength  right  up  into  the  present.  It  is
necessary to find the resonance bases for  the different  collective identifications that
characterize our history so as to avoid falling into the trap of envisioning such identities
as mere intellectual constructs that people have somehow been seduced into accepting.
16 The cosmopolitanism of certain elites is apparently a well established European habitus
or even tradition. This is clearly evident in the history of the Free Masonry. The latter,
after being taken over by aristocrats and then wealthy capitalists clearly expressed a set
of values that are equally visible in today’s world. Thus the new age managerialism that is
so common in the contemporary world of elites has its more aristocratic forerunners in
the Freemasonry of the past. These themes can be outlined as follows:
17 1. An opposition to organized religion in its Western form.
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18 2. An attraction to Oriental religious philosophy, not least its holism.
19 3. An interest in primitive and ancient religions.
20 4. The individual as the center of spirituality and a direct link to the sacred or godhead,
understood in pantheistic terms.
21 5. The superiority of the elect who can attain this relation to the sacred.
22 6. In political terms, an orientation to the world as a whole, to Mankind. 
23 – A. this implies opposition to the nation state or any other sub-national units except as
sources of spirituality.
24 – B. the internal differentiation between leaders and follow ers, or the elect and the rest.
25 7. In class terms this implies the formation of an international elite identity.
26 8. A millenaristic view of the future...the New Age which is to come.
27 These themes incorporate notions of  holism and of  being chosen by higher spiritual
powers. The elite is the « chosen few », selected to lead all of humanity to the promised
land. It implies distance rather than identity with the population that is subject to its rule
and this provides a link to the pluralism that is so prevalent in older and new versions of
multiculturalism. In one critical interpretation:
28 The cosmopolitan bourgeoisie in the eighteenth century came to adopt a perspective on its own
society as if it were a foreign one a target for « colonial » exploitation. Freemasonry provided a
cover  for  developing  the  new  identity  on  which  the  exploitation  of  members  of  one’s  own
community is premised. By entering the masonic lodges, merchants and those otherwise involved in
the  long‑distance  money  economy  such  as  lawyers  and  accountants,  realised  the  primordial
alienation from the community which is the precondition for market relations, exploitation of wage
labour, and abstract citizenship (Rosenstock-Huessy, 1961: 364, quoted in Pilj 1998).
29 Another aspect of this particular global position is its association with finance rather than
industrial production, so that finance is associated with the cosmpolitan as opposed to
industry which is crudely localized.
30 By being expressly non-manual, divorced from actual labour, British masonry reproduced
the  aristocratic  preference  for  arms-length  control  over  direct  entrepreneurial
involvement. The English gentleman preferred « to sit above the commercial fray, pulling
levers,  dangling  rewards  and  applying  sanctions »  (Hampden‑Turner  &  Trompenaars
1994: 321). 
31 This is an important logic, one that connects finance with the cosmopolitan, and in turn
with a sense of  a  higher power and even mission.  The values of  the humanism that
emerged in the enlightenment are very much woven together with this particular version
of cosmopolitanism. 
1.  
The small worlds of cosmopolitanism
32 One of the outcomes of the historical continuity in the cosmopolitan elite as a constant
category of the modern state is the production of social worlds that are more or less
socially  bounded.  Cosmopolitan  identity  commonly  represents  itself  as  world
encompassing as opposed to the smaller worlds of national and other more localized
populations. This is a significant, but also a telling, misrepresentation of reality, one that
confuses  geographical  with  social  closure.  It  has  led  to  absurd  assertions  that,  for
Champagne liberals and « classes dangereuses »
Journal des anthropologues, 96-97 | 2004
6
example, diasporas are instances of cosmopolitan openness, a notion that flies in the face
of  practically all  that  is  known of  such transnational  groups where boundaries  must
absolutely be maintained if the diaspora is to survive, implying high levels of endosocial
relations  including  endogamy and strict  control  over  children.  It  is,  in  this  respect,
enlightening to investigate the life of  transnational  elites,  which display some of the
characteristics of diasporas. An interesting study of what has been called l’immigration
dorée in France (Wagner, 1999) reveals a number of interesting properties of the social life
that as developed in such transnational elites. Focussing on foreign elite communities via
their relation to international schools and other associations, she depicts a two layered
structure, one newer, the product of the recent emergence of a transnational managerial
class  and the other the old,  more aristocratic,  cosmopolitan elites.  Although she has
concentrated on a relatively limited time period, it appears that almost a third of all
transnationals in her sample marry with other transnationals, though not necessarily of
the same nationality. They send their children to a limited number or schools where
education consists in learning to be international. They play at representing the world, at
being a United Nations devoted to a celebration of cultural difference and they often have
official  connections  with  these  international  organizations.  But  they  also  identify
themselves in the idiom of blood, even where it is mixed.
33 J’ai le sang ex-patrié… Je suis américain, de passeport et de nationalité mais ma famille et celle de
ma femme aussi, ont un grand nombre de ramifications dans beaucoup de pays, ce qui fait qu’on a
toujours eu un pied aux États‑Unis un pied à l’étranger (Wagner, id. : 116).
34 Mon père était un peu vagabond, et on avait ça dans les veines. Mes frères, c’est pareil : j’ai un frère
en Autriche, un en Finlande, une sœur en Espagne. Mon père se déplaçait beaucoup, et j’ai dû
prendre ça (ibidem).
35 The very expression « ex‑patriot blood » expresses a combination of roots and routes of
the  kind  announced  in  much  of  the  post‑colonial  cultural  studies  literature.  The
transnational is concretized in biological terms. The self  definition of a cosmopolitan
ethos which is common to both aristocratic and managerial groups is an essential part of
their self‑understanding.
36 La curiosité, l’ouverture, la tolérance sont des termes souvent employés pour désigner ces qualités
(id. : 142).
37 This is the ethos of the world traveler always open for new adventures, to new kinds of
experience and different kinds of people. But it should be noted that the actual social
arenas of these cosmopolitans are limited to a number of associations,  clubs,  schools
where  they  constantly  meet  and are  able  to  identify  one  another  by  their  common
interests, tastes, but also differences regarding national origins and cultures.
38 There  is  also  the  expression  of  the  opposition  between  themselves  and  the  more
terrestrial  ordinary nationals.  They latter  are even referred to as  terrestrials  in some
comments.
39 Alors le terrien, c’est quelqu’un qui a un espace limité. Son activité se concentre sur la terre qu’il
possède. Si l’autre va sur sa terre, il ne l’acceptera pas. Il est attaché à sa famille, à ses enfants, qu’il
veut garder chez lui, parce que sa famille cultive sa terre... L’Allemand est industriel et commercial.
Pour lui, le monde est grand... (id. : 204). 
40 And there is the opposition including the usual classification of the local « other ».
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41 Je crois que la classe populaire est plus attachée à ses origines. Les Anglais en France sont plutôt des
gens des classes moyennes.  En Angleterre les classes populaires sont plus nationalistes que les
autres, moins ouvertes (id. : 189).
42 If the cosmopolitan is a constant structure in the modern territorial and nation state, it
becomes  increasingly  salient  in  periods  of  globalization.  One  may  even  speak  of  an
unstable opposition between the local, national and the international in which ideological
dominance shifts markedly over time. 
43 At the very top of this hierarchy are the families that have been designated the grandes
fortunes.  This  group  keeps  its  distance  from  the  others,  with  its  own  clubs  and
associations, listed and ranked in journals like Le petit mondain, in terms of their places of
residence. 
44 Cosmopolitisme  des  relations  multiterritorialité  étendue  aux  pays  étrangers  ce  sont  là  deux
composantes essentielles de la haute société (Pinçon & Pinçon‑Charlot, 1996 : 120).
45 Wagner presents  the example of  the comte de Chatel.  His  genealogy is  mixed,  Italy,
England, Belgium, Argentina; marriages among the elites. The family’s capital is directly
linked to the family’s international segmentary structure. M. de Chatel is never an ex-
patriot when he travels. He is always on his own property somewhere in the world. But he
is also a professional chameleon in cultural if not class terms. 
46 Oui on me prenait pour un Anglais en Angleterre,  comme en Argentine on me prend pour un
Argentin. C’est un des seuls dons que m’ait donné le bon Dieu. J’imite les accents avec énormément
de facilités (il imite l’accent marseillais). Ça ne sert pas à grand‑chose, mais bon ! (Wagner, op. cit
. : 122). 
47 The differentiation between the upper crust and the managers,  besides being socially
marked in very clear terms, is also a difference between a cosmopolitan identity in which
an aristocratic world tends to be homogeneous and a more multinational world in which
cultures are compared and ranked. This may be more of a variation than a true difference
since there is a strong overlap in perspectives. But Wagner’s findings suggest a difference
in the two spheres.
48 Les deux formes de rapports  à l’étranger restent  néanmoins bien distinctes.  L’international  se
définit aussi par opposition au cosmopolite. Le cosmopolitisme repose sur la cohésion d’une petite
élite aristocratique, et ne met pas réellement en jeu des relations entre des cultures différentes. A
l’inverse, la culture internationale des cadres repose justement sur la valorisation de la diversité
des cultures nationales (id. : 212).
49 But in both groups there is a tendency toward a distancing to the local and the national
and an identification with the international or transnational.
50 La capacité d’etre chez soi, au sens à la fois matériel, social et symbolique dans plusieurs pays,
l’incorporation d’une identité cosmopolite qui produit ses effets sur toutes les dimensions de la
personne définissent bien le modèle vers lequel tend la culture internationale des cadres (ibidem).
1.  
Cosmopolitanization and globalization
51 In the graphics above I suggest that there is a tendency to cosmopolitanization of elites in
periods of strong globalization as we have today. This can be understood as a product of
the convergence of social and spatial mobility, one that situates its adherents above the
world where they can encompass the diversity that lies below without being part of it
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except in the sense of being able to consume it in the form of products. This distinction
creates an opposition to the local as something which is decidedly lower in status and
which conflates immobility with cultural poverty. It would be a mistake, thus, to assume
that the encompassing self‑representation of the cosmopolitan implies a real engagement
with the world. Geographical movement, yes, but this is within a narrow space of class in
which relations established are bounded and often highly segregated, in which identity is
strong and homogenous with respect to status and position. The negation of social praxis
in the self‑identification of the cosmopolitan is a logical outcome of the nature of social
position within this  system. The generalization of  cosmopolitanism to all  domains of
transnational  connections  appears  in  this  light  to  express  a  kind  of  struggle  for
ideological  hegemony.  This  generalization  tends  to  equate  cosmopolitanism  with
globalization itself and to generate the argument for the evolution from local to global
referred to above.  Locals are not merely at the bottom of this process,  they are also
represented as precursors to the present. They are in this sense primitive, but in a way
that  conflates  the  Freudian  primitivity,  libidinous  and  resident  in  all  of  us,  with  a
temporal  sense  of  being  backward  and  the  two  are  of  course  strongly  associated
evolutionary  discourses.  It  is  the  logic  of  this  representational  structure  which,
ultimately,  makes  the  local  dangerous  as  in  the  French  expression  « classes
dangereuses ».  Primitive culture,  of  course, is perfectly wonderful,  but it  needs to be
extracted from its  lived context  and transformed into objects  that  can be consumed
without danger. The museological understanding of culture that has become increasingly
popular in recent years expresses this sublimation or even displacement of the libidinous
and  potential  violence  of  otherness  into  objects  of  consumption/contemplation  and
celebration.  And,  it  is  this  transformation that  enables  diversity  to  be  collected and
displayed in the salons of the elites. This is also essential to the identification of such
elites with diversity and multiculturalism. The strength of this ideology depends on the
balance of forces in the field within which it is produced. 
52 Cosmopolitanism tends to emerge simultaneously with and in a dialectical relation to
localizing ideologies, with nationalism, and other regional identities. This is happening
today just as it occurred in the previous period of globalization between 1870 and 1920. It
is interesting to compare the two periods in this respect. The British Empire contains a
core of cosmopolitanism that is quite central to developments later in the 19th century. It
is Cecil Rhodes and his Society of the Elect whose strategy was to set the agenda for the
continued success of the Empire in this century. The League of Nations seems to have
been  conceived  in  part  by  this  group  as  was  the  Union  of  South  Africa  and  the
Commonwealth. One of the central members of this group displays the flexibility of this
particular elite.
53 Milner was not really a conservative at all. Milner had an idea – the idea that he obtained from
Toynbee and that he found also in Rhodes and in all the members of his Group. This idea had two
parts: that the extension and integration of the Empire and the development of social welfare was
essential to the continued existence of the British way of life, and that this British way of life was
an instrument which unfolded all the best and the highest capabilities of mankind (Quigley, 1981:
29).
54 But  the  group  was  perfectly  capable  of  forsaking  internationalism  for  reasons  of
expediency and following 1931 it embraced the model of national economic regulation
(Quigley,  op.  cit.:  248).  While  this  all  sounds like the extension of  empire it  must  be
understood as part of hegemonic decline and increasing competition. The turn of the
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century was a period of the fragmentation of empire, of the last European formal empire,
the  Habsburgs,  and the  already declining  Ottomans.  That  empire  was  understood as
traditionalist, religiously orthodox, rigid and yet its ranks were swelled by a new liberal
class of cosmopolitans, many of whom were Jews and who were protected by the imperial
court. Thus what is today considered progressive could easily be associated with the past,
with absolutism, while nationalism was understood as the way of the future. Now while
the  situation  was  more  complicated  than  this,  since  there  were  other  powerful
cosmopolitanisms in Europe, the emerging conflict in the world system was spurred on by
national competition all of which led to the Great War. The configuration of the period is
brilliantly captured in Gellner. 
55 Hence the deep irony of the situation: an authoritarian Empire, based on a medieval dynasty and
tied to the heavily dogmatic ideology of the Counter-Reformation, in the end, under the stimulus of
ethnic, chauvinistic, centrifugal agitation, found its most eager defenders amongst individualist
liberals, recruited in considerable part from an erstwhile pariah group and standing outside the
faith with which the state was once so deeply identified (Gellner, 1998: 12).
56 This was an arena that plunged into a war and strengthened the nation state as well
creating new such entities,  but which also established the League of Nations,  and an
international  strategy  of  nation  state  formation.  It  was  riddled  with  all  of  the
contradictions referred to above. In the end, however, the cosmopolitan was by and large
defeated.  In  the  current  situation  there  are  clearly  similar  tendencies,  but  political
organization seems to have a stronger tendency to empire formation, however fragile.
Thus  it  might  appear  that  cosmopolitan  tendencies  are  on  the  rise.  International
organizations, such as the United Nations, and the most powerful ideological apparatuses,
UNESCO, the World Bank and numerous other instances such as the World Economic
Council have all converged on a similar set of representations of world order. And the
heritage of  the Rhodes group as hegemony shifted to the United States,  is  clearly in
evidence, clearly exemplified in the post World War II clubs such as Bilderberg Group, the
Trilateral Commission and the Mount Pelerin Society where overlapping membership is
strong and which all culminates at Davos in the World Economic Forum. Global media
such CNN also partake in this ideology which is significant given the force of repetetive
imaging and moral framing in the creation of everyday reality, however virtual. It is also
significant  that  a  large  number  of  intellectual  elites,  academics  and politicians  have
become adepts of  this  world view.  I  have tried to detail  the way in which academic
anthropology has been influenced by this trend (Friedman, 1997, 1999, 2002), partaking in
the « postcolonial aura » (Dirlik, 1997) that celebrates movement in itself as « the good »
along with its identities, the transnational, translocal, transsexual, bordercrossing etc. as
opposed to the dangerous rednecked locals who are associated with nationalism, racism,
roots and that greatest of all evils, essentialism. This has even become a critique of what is
assumed to be the general anthropological perspective, well epitomized in expressions
such as the following:
57 … anthropologists’ obsession with boundedness is parallelled by the ways in which the people they
study try to deal with seemingly open-ended global flows (Meyer & Geschiere, 1999: 3).
58 What a pity that the people we study have got it  just  as wrong as ourselves.  We all
obviously are in need of re-education.
59 It should be noted that cosmopolitanism is not equivalent to internationalism. This is an
important distinction that even attracted the attention of Marcel Mauss who defined the
former as « deux sortes d’attitudes morales bien distinctes » (Mauss, 1969: 629). He chose
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to define cosmopolitanism as a set of ideas and tendencies oriented to the destruction of
the  nation,  while  internationalism  was  merely  against  nationalism  as  such  but  not
opposed to the nation state. Thus the socialist internationals struggled with these two
concepts and eventually chose the international rather than the cosmopolitan. But there
is another difference as well. The cosmopolitanism of the turn of the last century was
largely modernist in the legacy of Kant. It identified itself with universal values, moral,
rational and scientific. Contemporary cosmopolitanism is the descendent of aristocratic
transnationalism discussed above. It is a self identified status position and one which is
quite  the  contrary  of  Kantian  universalism  in  that  it  celebrates  and  encompasses
difference  rather  than  opposing  it.  This  is  why  the  notion  of  hybridity  is  a  logical
consequence  of  the  formation  of  such  identities.  The  cosmopolitan  today  is  not
rationalist-universalist but primarily a fusion of all cultures, expressed in the song title
« We are the world ». It is postmodernist rather than modernist, not the unification of
mankind in a unitary project, but the collection under a single roof of the world’s cultural
differences. And it this space of juxtaposed differences that is the hybrid space of the
global collector.
1.  
Empire?
60 The  large  volume  by  Hardt  and  Negri  is  an  interesting  example  of  the  continuing
reinforcement of a particular ideology of the global. This can be found in some of their
major thematic statemets. There is no question for them that we are entering a post-
imperialist world, one revealed by the end of the Vietnam war, by the disappearance of
the Berlin Wall and by the globalization of the world economy. They understand all of
this in evolutionary terms even if they are aware of the previous existence of empires and
that such structures are themselves fragile in the long run. The main changes that that
signal the new era are:
61 1. Rhizomatic  transformation,  equivalent  to  the  development  of  networks  of  power
replacing vertical state forms.
62 2. A foucauldian totalization of power; it’s everywhere and nowhere, therefore not in any
one hegemonic place such as the US.
63 3. The Openness of the imperial polity so that there is no longer any outside.
64 4. The emergence of the nomadic as dominant figure of the future.
65 5. The formation of a « multitude » to replace the former class‑defined proletariat.
66 The United States is the leader in this development. Europe is still based on territorially
strong national sovereignty while the US has transcended all that. In the US model we
already have the tendency to empire. Unfortunately the Indians had to go as they could
never really be inside, but the project remains an open one, the frontier that has always to
be  confronted  and  transcended  and  therefore  incorporated.  This  is  the  self-
representation of American pluralism in some ways and therefore is positive for many on
both the right and the left who vote for the immigrant nation. Empire is also inevitable,
which explains the largely felicitous attack on Arrighi’s theory of cycles. More consistent
with current globalizing ideology is the treatment of the nomadic as the star of the future.
The latter is defined as revolutionary whereas the local is relegated to the backward, even
harboring fascist potential. This, of course, is an argument for the globalists. Not only do
the nomads represent the good and progressive, but their very existence is enough to
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perform their historical task and pave the way for the final revolution of the multitude.
None of this is documented and it  could be interpreted as well  as a scenario for the
ultimate decline of one empire...heralding perhaps a new dark age or feudalism (already
taken  care  of  in  Appadurai’s  treatment  of  new  forms  of  citizenship,  i.e.  partial
membership and cross cutting ties). Where the authors of this book place themselves in
this world of overlapping global discourses is not at all clear, but the totalizing style of
the presentation is clearly something that produces resonance among many globalizers.
The  book  is  in  its  6th printing  and  has  been  hailed  from  many  quarters.  It  is  an
extraordinary text, praised by reviewers in such disparate places as Foreign Affairs, the
New York Times, lauded by authors close to journals like Public Culture. The text has a ring
of radical chic perhaps, transcending a number of former perspectives. No longer is there
a class issue. The latter is fast becoming a « multitude » whose principle characteristic is
its lack of a single unifying identity or strategic goal. The resistence to emergent Empire
is simply the essence of all multitude activities since they express projects that are not
the dictates of higher powers. The world to come is one that is totalized under Empire in
the same sense as globalization is assumed to make the world into a single place. For
both,  there  is  no  longer  an outside.  The  empire  is  defined as  all  encompassing  and
boundary‑less and the multitudes are characterized as migrant/nomadic,  not because
they are forced to be so, but because they are the essence of global desire, the desire to be
on the move, to deterritorialize. It is this which makes movement in itself, geographical
movement, progressive while immobility is reactionary. The same underlying perspective
can  be  found  among  globalizers,  who  see  a  glorious  future  in  a  diasporic  world  of
transnationals  (Appadurai,  1993;  Kelly,  1999)  that  express  a  higher  stage  and higher
status than the apparently potential rednecked homebodys who make up, unfortunately
for these authors, more than 98% of the world’s population. Both globalization discourse
and Empire represent the same set of basic themes. The major difference between the two
is that Empire includes a more holistic political image of the future than most of the
globalization literature, since the latter is almost entirely focused on lateral relations of
transmission and movement. Hardt and Negri take on the state and they also reformulate
the issue of class relations within their vision. But their totalization is of the same order.
This  is  why Foucault  is  so  important  in  characterizing  power,  which is  no  longer  a
verticalized  relation,  but  a  generalized  structure  of  total  control.  If  the  multitude
threatens  this  structure  it  is  because  it  expresses  the  same  properties  in  essence,
openness, nomadism and flexible multiculturism (Deleuze and Guattari). So perhaps the
revolution has already occured? If the projects of the multitude are an extention of those
of empire then its basically all the same. 
67 There  are  interesting  points  of  similarity  and overlap  here  between this  supposedly
radical thinking and cosmopolitan ideology. They can be summarized in the following
list:
68 1968 1998
69 The national The postnational
70 The local The global
71 Collective Individual
72 Social(ist) Liberal
73 Homogeneous Heterogeneous
74 Monocultural Multicultural
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75 Equality (sameness) Hierarchy (difference)
76 These terms are meant to capture the transition of self-identified progressive thinking
over a period of thirty years. These terms form sets of dualist oppositions and they are of
course somewhat oversimplified,  but not enough to miss the nature of the shift.  The
postnational  is  today  seen  as  the  royal  road  to  the  future  of  mankind  whereas  the
national is a horrible leftover from a nationalist past including essentialist and therefore
racist tendencies. The global similarly is an expression of this new nomadic desire to
transcend the  prison of  locality.  Individualism has crept  into  the former  collectivist
ideology  and  has  manged  to  associate  the  latter  with  Foucauldian  totalistic  control.
Similarly the liberal has successively cannibalized the socialist from the inside, producing
a great deal of confusion of the kind expressed in ideologies such as New Labor and
contemporary social  democracy in general.  The heterogeneous has become a goal  in
itself,  a  generalized  cultural  pluralism  of  different  identities,  religions  and  political
projects. This is a paradox in conditions where the advocates of such a position are also
liberal  individualists  since  the  cultural  identities  in  question  are  collective.  The
multicultural quandary is an expression of the same shift toward heterogeneity. The only
consistent  way out  of  the contradictions  of  this  position is  in  the transformation of
culture from a structure of existence to a mere role set, so that the individual can practice
culture by choice, by elective affinity, like joining the golf club instead of the Wahabists, at
least on Monday. In the process of this transition equality is increasingly replaced by
hierarchy via an emphasis on difference. This is the key to pluralism as a political form
one in which elite rule is essential. Difference becomes the dominant value while equality
is seen as an ugly result of totalitarian rule.
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NOTES
1.   These variations are reflected in major works of political philosophy as well, i.e. Rousseau,
Hegel etc. but the focus here is on the more spontaneous political representations as they emerge
in what can be called political culture.
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